The Secure Communication Terminal project is a digital, secured wireless communication device. Unlike a classic radio station, the device allows real-time voice capture, P2P transmission, and playback only if the user passes a biometric authentication filter. The system integrates a permission-based access hierarchy (Admin vs. User) and is controlled by an ESP32 microcontroller.

What is its purpose: The main goal is to build a robust physical product, a sort of industrial prototype, capable of combining modern access control technologies (fingerprint sensor) with high-fidelity digital audio processing. At a technical level, the project demonstrates mastery of microcontroller architectures through the simultaneous integration of several studied complex protocols (UART, I2C, I2S) and the efficient use of hardware interrupts for the system's state machine.

What was the starting idea: The idea stemmed from the main vulnerability of conventional analog radio stations: lack of security. Anyone owning a station on the same frequency can listen or transmit. I thought about how I could implement a fundamental principle of cybersecurity (*Access Control* based on “Something you are”) directly into the physical environment, transforming a simple communication station into a strictly restricted data terminal.

To illustrate the architecture of the Secure Communication Terminal, I have created a block diagram highlighting the hardware components and the data flow (communication protocols) between the peripherals and the central processing unit.

The terminal supports two types of users: Admin and General User.

• The Admin fingerprint is permanently stored and cannot be modified or overwritten.
• Only the Admin has the authority to enroll or remove a General User's fingerprint.
• Add User: The Admin authenticates by scanning their fingerprint, presses the action button briefly, and then the new user introduces their fingerprint.
• Remove User: The Admin authenticates and long-presses the action button for 5 seconds to wipe the General User from the database.

The OLED screen acts as the main interface, displaying the current communication status. During an incoming wireless transmission, an 'Incoming Transmission' message is shown on the screen.

If the device is unlocked (a user is logged in), the incoming audio is actively played through the speaker. Once authenticated, the user can receive and transmit freely for a 2-minute session before the system automatically times out, locks itself, and requires re-authentication.

The reset button must be held for 5 seconds to perform a full reset of the system.

System Architecture & Power Management: The hardware architecture centers on the ESP32, managing biometric security via UART and real-time audio through concurrent I2S buses. A critical design decision was made to ensure portability and prevent brownout resets during high-current audio playback.

The system is powered by a 4-cell AA battery holder utilizing NiMH rechargeable batteries (providing a stable ~4.8V). This power source is connected directly to the ESP32's VIN pin and the MAX98357A amplifier. This maximizes the audio output volume (staying safely below the amplifier's 5.5V absolute maximum rating) while allowing the ESP32's internal 3.3V regulator to safely power the logic-level peripherals (OLED, Mic, Fingerprint Sensor) without being overloaded by audio transients.

Detailed Pin Mapping & Motivation:

The project's software is built around a robust Finite State Machine (FSM) architecture, utilizing FreeRTOS capabilities for multitasking and asynchronous interrupt processing. This allows the separation of time-critical tasks (audio streaming) from low-priority tasks (UI updates).

* esp_now.h: Chosen over classic Wi-Fi or Bluetooth to eliminate router dependency and ensure ultra-low latency, which is essential for voice transmissions (Voice-over-Radio). * driver/i2s_std.h (ESP32 IDF): Used for direct control of the I2S bus. Unlike a standard analog ADC/DAC, I2S allows pure digital reading of the microphone and digital control of the amplifier, ensuring vastly superior audio quality free of circuit interference. * Adafruit_Fingerprint.h: Chosen for the efficient abstraction of UART communication with the AS608 sensor, greatly simplifying the complex mathematical operations involved in storing and matching biometric matrices. * freertos/queue.h: Vital for decoupling. It allows the separation of the radio reception process (ISR) from the audio playback process, using a memory queue to guarantee continuous voice playback without blocking.

The application backbone runs through transitions between 4 distinct states:

* STATE_LOCKED / ST_LOCKED: Default state. The system is completely isolated. The I2S output is muted, and the system polls the AS608 sensor via UART. * STATE_UNLOCKED / ST_UNLOCKED: Reached after a valid fingerprint match. A timer is started (2 minutes). * STATE_WAIT_ADMIN / ST_ADMIN: An intermediate state triggered when the Admin ID (ID 1) is recognized. Enables 'Enroll' and 'Delete' functions via the Action Button. Features an automatic 5-minute timeout. * STATE_LIVE_STREAM / ST_TRANSMIT: The “Walkie-Talkie” communication mode. Triggered by the PTT button (GPIO Interrupt), the station switches between Receiver and Transmitter modes (Half-Duplex). Audio is sampled via I2S and sent through ESP-NOW.

To avoid needing excessive physical buttons, temporal multiplexing is used for the Action Button:

• Short Press (< 2s): If in ST_ADMIN, it triggers the `fingerprintEnroll()` function to add the General User via a 3-step software routine.
• Long Press (> 5s): If in ST_ADMIN, it triggers `fingerprintDelete(USER_ID)` to wipe the database.

To prevent unauthorized interception of the radio traffic (packet sniffing), the system implements ESP-NOW's native AES-128 encryption at the MAC layer.

• Symmetric Keying: A 16-byte secret key (secretKey) is hardcoded and shared between the ALPHA and BRAVO terminals. This acts as both the Primary Master Key (PMK) and the Local Master Key (LMK).
• Secure Payload: By setting peerInfo.encrypt = true during the peer registration phase, the ESP32's Wi-Fi hardware automatically encrypts the outgoing 240-byte audio payloads and decrypts them upon arrival. This zero-overhead hardware encryption ensures that the P2P voice stream remains strictly confidential.

A major technical challenge was the limitation of the ESP-NOW hardware protocol, which strictly supports 250 bytes per payload. System calibration was achieved by reading the microphone stream (which is natively 32-bit) and truncating/packing it into a buffer of exactly 120 samples of 16-bit. The result is a packet of exactly 240 bytes, maximizing the available audio bandwidth without hitting the ceiling that would cause packet loss.

Received packets are captured through an interrupt routine (OnDataRecv) triggered asynchronously by the hardware, using the xQueueSendFromISR command to safely place the data into the playback buffer.

* Where: On the I2C bus (OLED Display). * How: The display.display() command was strictly restricted only to the moments when the device changes its state (e.g., transition from TX to RX). * Why: I2C is a much too slow bus compared to the frequency of the incoming radio packets (dozens per second). Updating the screen for every packet would have led to “CPU starvation”, severely fragmenting the audio playback fluency.

* Where: Background Noise Management (I2S Speaker). * How: In the absence of a valid radio signal in the FreeRTOS queue, the system constantly injects an array of zeros into the amplifier. * Why: This hardware method completely eliminates electrostatic hiss and white noise while in standby, maintaining absolute “digital silence” until the next transmission.

Link for DEMO: https://youtube.com/shorts/7HnLIHeZsL8?feature=share

For downloading the project files: https://github.com/Catalin951/Secure-Communication-Terminal/tree/main

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