Laboratorul 04 - PRFs, PRPs, SPNs

utils.py
import base64
 
# CONVERSION FUNCTIONS
def _chunks(string, chunk_size):
    for i in range(0, len(string), chunk_size):
        yield string[i:i+chunk_size]
 
# THIS ONE IS NEW
def byte_2_bin(bval):
    """
      Transform a byte (8-bit) value into a bitstring
    """
    return bin(bval)[2:].zfill(8)
 
def _hex(x):
    return format(x, '02x')
 
def hex_2_bin(data):
    return ''.join(f'{int(x, 16):08b}' for x in _chunks(data, 2))
 
def str_2_bin(data):
    return ''.join(f'{ord(c):08b}' for c in data)
 
def bin_2_hex(data):
    return ''.join(f'{int(b, 2):02x}' for b in _chunks(data, 8))
 
def str_2_hex(data):
    return ''.join(f'{ord(c):02x}' for c in data)
 
def bin_2_str(data):
    return ''.join(chr(int(b, 2)) for b in _chunks(data, 8))
 
def hex_2_str(data):
    return ''.join(chr(int(x, 16)) for x in _chunks(data, 2))
 
# XOR FUNCTIONS
def strxor(a, b):  # xor two strings, trims the longer input
    return ''.join(chr(ord(x) ^ ord(y)) for (x, y) in zip(a, b))
 
def bitxor(a, b):  # xor two bit-strings, trims the longer input
    return ''.join(str(int(x) ^ int(y)) for (x, y) in zip(a, b))
 
def hexxor(a, b):  # xor two hex-strings, trims the longer input
    return ''.join(_hex(int(x, 16) ^ int(y, 16)) for (x, y) in zip(_chunks(a, 2), _chunks(b, 2)))
 
# BASE64 FUNCTIONS
def b64decode(data):
    return bytes_to_string(base64.b64decode(string_to_bytes(data)))
 
def b64encode(data):
    return bytes_to_string(base64.b64encode(string_to_bytes(data)))
 
# PYTHON3 'BYTES' FUNCTIONS
def bytes_to_string(bytes_data):
    return bytes_data.decode()  # default utf-8
 
def string_to_bytes(string_data):
    return string_data.encode()  # default utf-8

In this recitation, we shall do some exercises related to PRFs, PRPs and DES. Please check the course available here and make sure you understand the basic definitions and principles before moving forward to solving the exercises.

Exercise 1 (4p)

Let $F : K × X \to Y$ be a secure PRF with $K = X = Y = \{0, 1\}^{n}$.

  • a) Show that $F_1(k,x) = F(k,x) \| 0$ is not a secure PRF. (for strings $y$ and $z$ we use $y \| z$ to denote the concatenation of $y$ and $z$);
  • b) Prove that $F_2(k, x) = F \left(k, x \oplus 1^{n}\right)$ is a secure PRF. Here $x \oplus 1^{n}$ is the bit-wise complement of $x$. To prove security argue the contra-positive: a distinguisher $A$ that breaks $F_2$ implies a distinguisher $B$ that breaks $F$ and whose running time is about the same as $A$’s.
  • c) Let $K_3 = \{0, 1\}^{n+1}$. Construct a new PRF $F_3 : K_3 \times X \to Y$ with the following property: the PRF $F_3$ is secure, however if the adversary learns the last bit of the key then the PRF is no longer secure. This shows that leaking even a single bit of the secret key can completely destroy the PRF security property.

Hint: Let $k_3 = k \| b$ where $k \in \{0,1\}^{n}$ and $b \in \{0,1\}$. Set $F_3(k_3,x)$ to be the same as $F (k, x)$ for all $x \neq 0^{n}$. Define $F_3\left(k_3, 0^{n}\right)$ so that $F_3$ is a secure PRF, but becomes easily distinguishable from a random function if the last bit of the secret key $k_3$ is known to the adversary. Prove that your $F_3$ is a secure PRF by arguing the contra-positive, as in part (b).

  • d) Construct a new PRF $F_4 : K × X \to Y$ that remains secure if the attacker learns any single bit of the key. Your function $F_4$ may only call $F$ once. Briefly explain why your PRF remains secure if any single bit of the key is leaked.

Exercise 2-3-4

Let's analyse some substitution-permutation networks (SPN).

SPN 1 (3p)

We have the SPN from this figure:

where S denotes the AES S-box (we'll discuss this in some detail during the next lecture), and 'Permutation' is a simple permutation block that simply shifts the input 4 bits to the right as in a queue. Both this S-box and the permutation are invertible and known by the attacker (you). Each input (x1, x2) is 8-bit (1 byte), as well as the keys k1, k2, and the outputs y1, y2.

  1. How can you find the key ?
  2. Given the message/ciphertext pair ('Hi' - as characters, 0xba52 - as hex number), find the key bytes k1 and k2. Print them in ascii.

For these exercises you can use the following helper/starter code:

spn1.py
from utils import *
 
# Rijndael S-box
sbox = [0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67,
        0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76, 0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59,
        0x47, 0xf0, 0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0, 0xb7,
        0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc, 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1,
        0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15, 0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05,
        0x9a, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75, 0x09, 0x83,
        0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0, 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29,
        0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84, 0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b,
        0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa,
        0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85, 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c,
        0x9f, 0xa8, 0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5, 0xbc,
        0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2, 0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec,
        0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19,
        0x73, 0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88, 0x46, 0xee,
        0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb, 0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49,
        0x06, 0x24, 0x5c, 0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79,
        0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9, 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4,
        0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08, 0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6,
        0xb4, 0xc6, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a, 0x70,
        0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e, 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9,
        0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e, 0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e,
        0x94, 0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf, 0x8c, 0xa1,
        0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0,
        0x54, 0xbb, 0x16]
 
# Rijndael Inverted S-box
rsbox = [0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38, 0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3,
         0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb, 0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f,
         0xff, 0x87, 0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb, 0x54,
         0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d, 0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b,
         0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e, 0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24,
         0xb2, 0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25, 0x72, 0xf8,
         0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16, 0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d,
         0x65, 0xb6, 0x92, 0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda,
         0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84, 0x90, 0xd8, 0xab,
         0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a, 0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3,
         0x45, 0x06, 0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02, 0xc1,
         0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b, 0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41,
         0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6,
         0x73, 0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85, 0xe2, 0xf9,
         0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e, 0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d,
         0x29, 0xc5, 0x89, 0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b,
         0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20, 0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0,
         0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4, 0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07,
         0xc7, 0x31, 0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x60,
         0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d, 0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f,
         0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef, 0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5,
         0xb0, 0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61, 0x17, 0x2b,
         0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26, 0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55,
         0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d]
 
 
def permute4(s):
    """
      Perform a permutatation by shifting all bits 4 positions right.
      The input is assumed to be a 16-bit bitstring
    """
    ps = ''
    ps = ps + s[12:16]
    ps = ps + s[0:12]
    return ps
 
 
def permute_inv4(s):
    """
      Perform the inverse of permute4
      The input is assumed to be a 16-bit bitstring
    """
    ps = ''
    ps = ps + s[4:16]
    ps = ps + s[0:4]
    return ps
 
 
def spn_1r_reduced_2s(k, x):
    """
      Performs an encryption with a substitution-permutation network.
      Key k = {k1, k2}, total of 16 bits (2 x 8 bits)
      Input x = {x1, x2}, total of 16 bits (2 x 8 bits)
      Both k and x are assumed to be bitstrings.
 
      Return:
      a 16-bit bitstring containing the encryption y = {y1, y2}
    """
 
    # Split input and key
    x1 = x[0:8]
    x2 = x[8:16]
    k1 = k[0:8]
    k2 = k[8:16]
 
    # Apply S-box
    u1 = bitxor(x1, k1)
    v1 = sbox[int(u1, 2)]
    v1 = byte_2_bin(v1)
 
    u2 = bitxor(x2, k2)
    v2 = sbox[int(u2, 2)]
    v2 = byte_2_bin(v2)
 
    # Apply permutation
    pin = v1 + v2
    pout = permute4(pin)
 
    return pout
 
 
def spn_1r_full_2s(k, x):
    """
      Performs an encryption with a substitution-permutation network.
      Key k = {k1, k2, k3, k4}, total of 32 bits (4 x 8 bits)
      Input x = {x1, x2}, total of 16 bits (2 x 8 bits)
      Both k and x are assumed to be bitstrings.
 
      Return:
      a 16-bit bitstring containing the encryption y = {y1, y2}
    """
 
    # Split input and key
    x1 = x[0:8]
    x2 = x[8:16]
    k1 = k[0:8]
    k2 = k[8:16]
    k3 = k[16:24]
    k4 = k[24:32]
 
    # Apply S-box
    u1 = bitxor(x1, k1)
    v1 = sbox[int(u1, 2)]
    v1 = byte_2_bin(v1)
 
    u2 = bitxor(x2, k2)
    v2 = sbox[int(u2, 2)]
    v2 = byte_2_bin(v2)
 
    # Apply permutation
    pin = v1 + v2
    pout = permute4(pin)
 
    # Apply final XOR
    po1 = pout[0:8]
    po2 = pout[8:16]
    y1 = bitxor(po1, k3)
    y2 = bitxor(po2, k4)
 
    return y1+y2
 
 
def main():
 
    # Run reduced 2-byte SPN
    msg = 'Hi'
    key = '??'  # Find this
    xs = str_2_bin(msg)
    ks = str_2_bin(key)
    ys = spn_1r_reduced_2s(ks, xs)
    print('Two y halves of reduced SPN: ' + ys[0:8] + ' (hex: ' + bin_2_hex(
        ys[0:8]) + '), ' + ys[8:16] + ' (hex: ' + bin_2_hex(ys[8:16]) + ')')
 
    # Run full 2-byte SPN
    msg = 'Om'
    key = '????'  # Find this
    xs = str_2_bin(msg)
    ks = str_2_bin(key)
    ys = spn_1r_full_2s(ks, xs)
    print('Two y halves of full SPN (2 bytes): ' + ys[0:8] + ' (hex: ' + bin_2_hex(
        ys[0:8]) + '), ' + ys[8:16] + ' (hex: ' + bin_2_hex(ys[8:16]) + ')')
 
 
if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()  

SPN 2 (3p)

Now we have a better SPN, where the output of the permutation is XOR-ed with another 2 key bytes, as in the following figure:

  1. Try to find the key in this case, when given the following message/ciphertext pairs: ('Om', 0x0073), ('El', 0xd00e), ('an', 0x855b). Print the key in ascii.

You may try some kind of brute-force search

SPN 3 (Bonus)

As another example, which uses a larger block size, let's use an SPN that takes a 4-byte input x=[x1 || x2 || x3 || x4] and an 8-byte key k=[k1 || k2 || k3 || k4 || k5 || k6 || k7 || k8] as in this figure:

Note that in this 4-byte SPN, the permutation operates on all 4 bytes, similarly to the 2-byte SPN: that is, it shifts all bits four bits to the right.

  1. Try to find the key in this case as well, using the following message/ciphertext pairs: ('Omul', 0xddcf7bc7), ('stea', 0x96d58b43), ('luna', 0x9c3f2303) . Again print the key in ascii.

This time you cannot (easily) do a brute-force on all the bytes of the last XOR. However, you may try to attack one S-box at a time. Think of the bits that affect one such S-box and find an efficient attack. Suppose you brute force k5 and k6, is it possible to find out k1?

ic/laboratoare/04.txt · Last modified: 2020/11/02 01:08 by acosmin.maria
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