



# Rooting Android

## Lecture 10

Security of Mobile Devices

2018



**SMD**

Root

Root Access on Different Types of Builds

Root Access on Production Builds

Full Rooting Tutorial

Bibliography

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- ▶ Linux kernel - DAC security model
- ▶ Root user (UID 0) - absolute power
- ▶ Root on Android:
  - ▶ Bypass Android sandbox
  - ▶ Access and modify any file
  - ▶ Modify read-only partitions
  - ▶ Control system services
  - ▶ Remove system applications

- ▶ Root access not allowed on production devices
- ▶ Limit system processes with root permission
  - ▶ Avoid privilege escalation
- ▶ SELinux - global security policy
  - ▶ Root processes don't have unrestricted access
  - ▶ Still have access to private data
  - ▶ Can modify system behavior
  - ▶ Exploit kernel vulnerability

- ▶ Debugging and reverse engineering apps
- ▶ System customizations
- ▶ Implementing special applications
  - ▶ Firewall
  - ▶ Full device backup
  - ▶ Network sharing

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- ▶ `ro.build.type` system property
- ▶ *user* build:
  - ▶ No diagnostics and development tools
  - ▶ ADB daemon disabled
  - ▶ Debugging only for apps with `debuggable true`
  - ▶ No root access using shell
- ▶ *userdebug* build:
  - ▶ Allows debugging of all apps
  - ▶ ADB enabled





```
marlin:/ $ getprop ro.build.type
user
marlin:/ $ getprop ro.secure
1
marlin:/ $ ps -ef | grep adb
shell          693      1 0 09:42:05 ?        00:00:05  adb ---root.seclabel=u:r:su:s0
marlin:/ $ cat /proc/693/status
Name:         adb
State:        S (sleeping)
Tgid:         693
Pid:          693
PPid:         1
TracerPid:   0
Uid:          2000    2000    2000    2000
Gid:          2000    2000    2000    2000
Ngid:         0
FDSize:       64
Groups:       1004  1007  1011  1015  1028  3001  3002  3003  3006  3009  3011
[.]
CapInh:       0000000000000000
CapPrm:       0000000000000000
CapEff:       0000000000000000
CapBnd:       0000000000000000c0
CapAmb:       0000000000000000
Seccomp:      0
[.]
```

- ▶ Allows debugging of all apps
- ▶ ADB enabled
- ▶ `ro.secure = 0`
  - ▶ ADB daemon continues to run as root
  - ▶ Does not drop capabilities - full capability bounding set

- ▶ Obtain root shell
- ▶ Run command as another UID
- ▶ On *userdebug* without restarting ADB as root
- ▶ Default su can be used only by root (0) and shell (2000) users
- ▶ Sets UID and GID to 0
- ▶ Commands executed from the shell inherit privileges

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- ▶ In production:
  - ▶ *user* build
  - ▶ ADB daemon runs as shell user
  - ▶ No su command
  - ▶ No system/core OS configuration
  - ▶ No access to the kernel
- ▶ Rooting a device
  - ▶ Unlocked bootloader

1. Write new boot image (custom kernel)
  - ▶ *eng* or *userdebug*
  - ▶ *ro.secure*, *ro.debuggable*
  - ▶ Current *user* builds disable ADB root
  - ▶ ADB daemon ignores properties
2. Unpack system image, write su, write system partition
  - ▶ Would allow su access from third-party apps
  - ▶ From Android 4.3, system mounted with *nosetuid*
  - ▶ Apps cannot execute SUID programs
  - ▶ Zygote processes without capabilities

- ▶ SELinux enforcing mode:
  - ▶ Execute with root -> security context unchanged, MAC policy
- ▶ SELinux must be disabled for root access
- ▶ Disable security measures
- ▶ No system updates from the manufacturer

- ▶ OTA package - add and modify system files
- ▶ Without rewriting the whole OS
- ▶ Superuser apps:
  - ▶ OTA package to be installed from recovery OS
  - ▶ Manager application (updatable)



- ▶ OTA package and application
- ▶ Developed by Jorrit “Chainfire” Jongma
- ▶ Actively maintained
- ▶ Most popular

- ▶ Native binaries for arm, arm64, armv7, mips, mips64, x86, x64
- ▶ Scripts for installing and starting SuperSU daemon
- ▶ Apk of management application
- ▶ Updater scripts
  - ▶ update-binary, updater-script

- ▶ Mount rootfs, system and data partitions as read-write
- ▶ Copy su and daemonsu to `/system/xbin/`
- ▶ Copy apk to `/system/app/` -> installed at reboot
- ▶ Copy `install-recovery.sh` to `/system/etc/`

- ▶ Set permissions and SELinux security labels of installed binaries
  - ▶ `u:object_r:system_file:s0` label
- ▶ Call `/system/xbin/su --install`
  - ▶ Post-install initialization
- ▶ Unmount system and data partitions

## Samsung Galaxy S7 Edge

```
hero2lte:/ # cat init.supersu.rc
# earliest possible SuperSU daemon launch, with fallback to service
on post-fs-data
    exec u:r:supersu:s0 root root — /sbin/launch_daemonsu.sh post-fs-data

# mount /data/su.img to /su
on property:sukernel.mount=1
    mount ext4 loop@/data/su.img /su noatime

# launch SuperSU daemon
service daemonsu /sbin/launch_daemonsu.sh service
    class late_start
    user root
    seclabel u:r:supersu:s0
    oneshot
```

- ▶ Bypass security constraints (no capabilities, SELinux)
- ▶ Usage:
  - ▶ Apps use su binary
  - ▶ Sends commands through socket to daemonsu
  - ▶ Executes commands as root in `u:r:supersu:s0` SELinux context

## Samsung Galaxy S7 Edge

```
hero2lte:/ $ ps -Z
LABEL USER  PID  PPID  VSIZE  RSS   WCHAN  PC  NAME
u:r:supersu:s0  root    3217  1     7664   660
__skb_recv 0000000000 S daemonsu:mount:master
u:r:supersu:s0  root    3224  1     11776  672
__skb_recv 0000000000 S daemonsu:master
[.]
u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 u0_a192  6687  3281
1848480 91888 SyS_epoll_ 0000000000 S eu.chainfire.supersu
[.]
u:r:shell:s0  shell    24047 19245 7664   1936  poll_sched 7c09943a78 S su
u:r:supersu:s0  root    24050 19251 16032  1816
poll_sched 77574aea78 S daemonsu:0:24047
u:r:supersu:s0  root    24051 24050 7736   1752  poll_sched 78d326ca78 S sush
```

---

```
hero2lte:/ $ su -c sleep 100
```

- ▶ Run `su -c sleep 100` from shell
- ▶ `su` process executes as shell, in the `u:r:shell:s0` domain
- ▶ `su` sends command to `daemonsu:0:24047`
  - ▶ An instance of `daemonsu` created to run the command
- ▶ `daemonsu` executes as root, in `u:r:supersu:s0` domain
- ▶ `daemonsu` executes starts `sush` to run `sleep`
  - ▶ `sush` executes as root, in `u:r:supersu:s0` domain



- ▶ `eu.chainfire.supersu` process
- ▶ Asks the user to grant root access when needed
- ▶ One time, a period, permanently
- ▶ White list of applications

- ▶ CyanogenMod (now LineageOS)
- ▶ Start su as daemon in `init.superuser.rc`
  - ▶ `service su_daemon /system/xbin/su --daemon`
- ▶ Service started or stopped using `persist.sys.root_access` property
  - ▶ Value 0-3 - root access to none, apps, adb shell, or both

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- ▶ Settings -> Enable Developer Options, OEM unlocking, USB debugging
- ▶ Download TWRP for hero2lte (code name)
- ▶ Enter Download/Odin mode by pressing [Volume Down] + [Home] + [Power]
- ▶ Write TWRP on device using Odin (Windows)
- ▶ Immediately enter Recovery mode by pressing [Volume Up] + [Home] + [Power]



- ▶ In TWRP - format data partition
- ▶ Push SuperSU and no-verity archives to sdcard
- ▶ Install no-verity using TWRP
- ▶ Install SuperSU using TWRP
- ▶ Reboot - it might take a little while



- ▶ Download the latest SuperSU application
- ▶ Download the latest TWRP application
- ▶ From SuperSU, grant permissions to apps that require root
- ▶ `adb shell -> $ su -> #`

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- ▶ Root access
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- ▶ User build
- ▶ Engineering build
- ▶ SuperSU
- ▶ TWRP
- ▶ LineageOS