

Android Security Mechanisms Lecture 8

Operating Systems Practical

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UIDs and File Access

Android Permissions

Cryptographic Providers

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Each apk signed with a certificate

- Generated using the developer's private key
- Identifies the developer of the application
- Can be self-signed
- System applications signed with the platform key
- Update allowed only if the certificate matches



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- Unique UID at install time for each application
- Access rights on application's files other applications cannot access those files
- Shared UID
 - sharedUserId attribute of <manifest>
 - Signed with the same key
 - ► Treated as the same application, same UID and file permissions
- Share files with other applications
 - MODE_WORLD_READABLE or MODE_WORLD_WRITABLE when creating a file
 - Gives read or write access to files



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- By default, applications cannot perform operations to impact other apps, the OS or the user
- Permission the ability to perform a particular operation
- Built-in permissions documented in the platform API reference
 - Defined in the android package
- Custom permissions defined by system or user apps
- pm list permissions
- Defining package + .permission + name
 - android.permission.REBOOT
 - com.android.laucher3.permission.RECEIVE_LAUNCH_-BROADCASTS



- Apps request permissions in AndroidManifest.xml <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.INTERNET" />
- Permissions handled by the PackageManager service
- Central database of installed packages
 - /data/system/packages.xml
- Programatically access package information from android.content.pm.PackageManager
 - setPackageInfo() returns PackageInfo instance
- Cannot be changed or revoked without uninstalling app (until Android 5.1)
- Android 6.0: apps request permissions at runtime



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A permission can be enforced in a number of places

- Making a call into the system
- Starting an activity
- Starting and binding a service
- Sending and receiving broadcasts
- Accessing a content provider



- Potential risk and procedure to grant permission
- Normal
 - Low risk
 - Automatically granted without user confirmation
 - ► ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE, GET_ACCOUNTS
- Dangerous
 - Access to user data or control over the device
 - Requires user confirmation
 - ▶ CAMERA, READ_SMS





Signature

- Highest level of protection
- Apps signed with the same key as the app that declared the permission
- Built-in signature permissions are used by system apps (signed with platform key)
- ▶ NET_ADMIN, ACCESS_ALL_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
- SignatureOrSystem
 - Apps part of system image or signed with the same key as the app that declared the permission
 - Vendors may have preinstalled apps without using the platform key





- ► All dangerous permissions belong to permission groups
- Until Android 5.1:
 - Permission groups are requested at install time (not the individual permissions)
- On Android 6.0:
 - If there is no other permission in that group, it requests the user's confirmation for that permission group
 - If there is another permission in that group already granted, it does not request any confirmation
- Examples of dangerous permission groups:
 - Calendar, Camera, Contacts, Location, Phone, SMS, Sensors, Storage, Microphone



- Access to regular files, device nodes and local sockets managed by the Linux kernel, based on UID, GID
- Permissions are mapped to supplementary GIDs
- Built-in permission mapping in /etc/permission/platform.xml
- Example:
 - INTERNET permission associated with GID inet
 - Only apps with INTERNET permission can create network sockets
 - The kernel verifies if the app belongs to GID inet



- Static permission enforcement
 - System keeps track of permissions associated to each app component
 - Checks whether callers have the required permission before allowing access
 - Enforcement by runtime environment
 - Isolating security decisions from business logic
 - Less flexible
- Dynamic permission enforcement
 - Components check to see if the caller has the necessary permissions
 - Decisions made by each component, not by runtime environment
 - More fine-grained access control
 - More operations in components



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- Helper methods in android.content.Context class to perform permission check
- checkPermission(String permission, int pid, int uid)
 - Returns PERMISSION_GRANTED or PERMISSION_DENIED
 - For root and system, permission is automatically granted
 - If permission is declared by calling app, it is granted
 - Deny for private components
 - Queries the Package Manager
- enforcePermission(String permission, int pid, int uid, String message)
 - Throws SecurityException with message if permission is not granted



- An app tries to call a component of another app intent
- Target component android:permission attribute
- Caller <uses-permission>
- Activity Manager
 - Resolves intent
 - Checks if target component has an associated permission
 - Delegates permission check to Package Manager
- If caller has necessary permission, the target component is started
- Otherwise, a SecurityException is generated



- Permission checks for activities
 - Intent is passed to Context.startActivity() or startActivityForResult()
 - Resolves to an activity that declares a permission
- Permission checks for services
 - Intent passed to Context.startService() or stopService() or bindService()
 - Resolves to a service that declares a permission
- If caller does not have the necessary permission, generates SecurityExceptions



- Protect the whole component or a particular exported URI
- Different permissions for reading and writing
- Read permission ContentResolver.query() on provider or URI
- Write permission ContentResolver.insert(), update(), delete() on provider or URI
- Synchronous checks



Receivers may be required to have a permission

- Context.sendBroadcast(Intent intent, String receiverPermission)
- Check when delivering intent to receivers
- No permission broadcast not received, no exception
- Broadcasters may need to have a permission to send a broadcast
 - Specified in manifest or in registerReceiver
 - Checked when delivering broadcast
 - ► No permission no delivery, no exception
- > 2 checks for each delivery: for sender and receiver





- Declared by apps
- Checked statically by the system or dynamically by the components
- Declared in AndroidManifest.xml

```
<prermission - tree
android :name="com.example.app.permission"
android :label="@string/example_permission_tree_label" />
<premission -group
android :name="com.example.app.permission_group.TEST_GROUP"
android :label="@string/test_permission_group_label"
android :description="@string/test_permission_group_desc" />
<premission
android :name="com.example.app.permission.PERMISSION1"
android :label="@string/permission1_label"
android :description="@string/permission1_desc"
android :permissionGroup="com.example.app.permission-group.TEST_GROUP"
android :permissionGroup="com.example.app.permission-group.TEST_GROUP"
android :permissionGroup="com.example.app.permission-group.TEST_GROUP"
android :protectionLevel="signature" />
```



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- Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA)
 - Extensible cryptographic provider framework
 - Set of APIs major cryptographic primitives
 - Applications specify an algorithm, do not depend on particular provider implementation
- Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP)
 - Package with implementation of cryptographic services
 - Advertises the implemented services and algorithms
 - JCA maintains a registry of providers and their algorithms
 - Providers in a order of preference
- Service Provider Interface (SPI)
 - Common interface for implementations of a specific algorithm
 - Abstract class implemented by provider



- JCA engines provide:
 - Cryptographic operations (encrypt/decrypt, sign/verify, hash)
 - Generation or conversion of cryptographic material (keys, parameters)
 - Management and storage of cryptographic objects (keys, certificates)
- Decouple client code from algorithm implementation
- Static factory method getInstance()
- Request implementation indirectly

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Hash function

- Data provided in chuncks using update() then call digest()
- If data is short and fixed hashed in one step using digest()



- Digital signature algorithms based on asymmetric encryption
- Algorithm name: <digest>with<encryption>
- Sign:

```
byte[] data = "message to be signed".getBytes("ASCII");
Signature s = Signature.getInstance("SHA256withRSA");
s.initSign(privKey);
s.update(data);
byte[] signature = s.sign();
```

Verify:

```
Signature s = Signature.getInstance("SHA256withRSA");
s.initVerify(pubKey);
s.update(data);
boolean valid = s.verify(signature);
```



- Encryption and decryption operations
- Encryption:

```
Secret key = getSecretKey();
Cipher c = Cipher.getInstance("AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding");
byte[] iv = new byte[c.getBlockSize()];
SecureRandom sr = new SecureRandom();
sr.nextBytes(iv);
IvParameterSpec ivp = new IvParameterSpec(iv);
c.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, key, ivp);
byte[] data = "Message to encrypt".getBytes("UTF-8");
byte[] ciphertext = c.doFinal(data);
```



Decryption:

```
byte[] data = c.doFinal(ciphertext);
```

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Message Authentication Code algorithms

```
SecretKey key = getSecretKey();
Mac m = Mac.getInstance("HmacSha256");
m.init(key);
byte[] data = "Message".getBytes("UTF-8");
byte[] hmac = m.doFinal(data);
```

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- Generates symmetric keys
- Additional checks for weak keys
- Set key parity when necessary
- Takes advantage of the cryptographic hardware

```
KeyGenerator kg = KeyGenerator.getInstance("HmacSha256");
SecretKey key = kg.generateKey();
```

```
KeyGenerator kg = KeyGenerator.getInstance("AES");
kg.init(256);
SecretKey key = kg.generateKey();
```



Generates public and private keys

```
KeyPairGenerator kpg = KeyPairGenerator.getInstance("RSA");
kpg.initialize(1024);
KeyPair pair = kpg.generateKeyPair();
PrivateKey priv = pair.getPrivate();
PublicKey pub = pair.getPublic();
```

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- Harmony's Crypto Provider
 - Limited JCA provider part of the Java runtime library
 - SecureRandom (SHA1PRNG), KeyFactory (DSA)
 - MessageDigest (SHA-1), Signature (SHA1withDSA)
- Android's Bouncy Castle Provider
 - Full-featured JCA provider
 - Part of the Bouncy Castle Crypto API
 - Cipher, KeyGenerator, Mac, MessageDigest, SecretKeyFactory, Signature, CertificateFactory
 - Large number of algorithms
- AndroidOpenSSL Provider
 - Native code, performance reasons
 - Covers most functionality of Bouncy Castle
 - Preferred provider
 - Implementation uses JNI to access OpenSSL's native code



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- Android Security Internals, Nikolay Elenkov
- http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/ security/permissions.html

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- Permissions
- Protection levels
- Static enforcement
- Dynamic enforcement

- Custom permissions
- Java Cryptography Architecture
- Cryptographic Service Provider

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Engine classes

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